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An environmental mandate, now what?
Executive summary
In March 2021, the UK Government explicitly included the support for the
transition to a net zero economy in the mandate of the Bank of England. In
response, the Bank announced it would green its Corporate Bond Purchase
Scheme (CBPS) and by November 2021 it provided details about the greening
framework. The Bank plans to use a climate scorecard that evaluates the bond
issuers’ climate performance and tilt purchases towards companies that are
stronger climate performers within their sectors.
The new environmental mandate has created a unique opportunity for the Bank
to play a leading role in the decarbonisation of monetary policy. However, the
approach that the Bank has taken to green the CBPS lacks ambition. The Bank’s
greening strategy has two fundamental limitations. First, it relies on a ‘carrots
first, sticks later’ principle that precludes the introduction of substantial penalties
for poor climate performers, at least at a first stage. Second, the Bank remains
committed to the principle of ‘market neutrality’, despite having recognised
its inherent carbon bias. This restricts the Bank’s ability to reduce subsidies it
extends to carbon-intensive activities in the CBPS.
We explore these limitations through a quantitative analysis that replicates the
tilting of CBPS holdings as proposed in the Bank’s approach, and we show the
following:
 The Bank’s tilting framework cannot reduce the representation of
carbon-intensive activities in the CBPS and can paradoxically lead to some
carbon-intensive companies getting better treatment than environmentally
friendly companies. This is a consequence of the Bank’s continued
adherence to the market neutrality principle, which leads to the tilting of
CBPS holdings within sectors so that the scheme continues to reproduce the
underlying sectoral composition of the bond market.
 The Bank’s tilting approach is not going to substantively reduce the
Weighted Average Carbon Intensity (WACI) of the CBPS portfolio. In our
replication, the WACI would only decline by 7%. Thus, the Bank will find
it challenging to achieve even its own target of 25% reduction in WACI by
2025.
To help the Bank of England genuinely lead by example on the decarbonisation
of monetary policy, we propose two alternatives: Strong Tilting and Strong
Tilting+Exclusion. The Strong Tilting option adds activities-based taxonomies
into the tilting strategy and reallocates purchases across different sectors without
being restricted by the market neutrality principle. In the Strong Tilting+Exclusion
option, we additionally exclude from the Bank’s holdings the bonds of fossil fuel
companies and the bonds issued by non-renewable electricity utilities with a poor
climate performance. Our quantitative analysis shows the following:
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 Our proposals would substantially reduce the subsidies that the Bank
of England extends to companies engaged in carbon-intensive activities.
Under the Strong Tilting option, the proportion of carbon-intensive bonds
in the total CBPS holdings declines from 54% to 48%. In the Strong
Tilting+Exclusion option, this proportion declines even more to 36%.
 Under the Strong Tilting option, the WACI of the CBPS portfolio declines
by 11%, while Strong Tilting+Exclusion leads to a decline of WACI by 39%,
allowing the Bank to achieve its 2025 target right now instead of waiting for
three more years.
Importantly, the Strong Tilting+Exclusion option will likely have the strongest
impact on the decarbonisation of the UK economy. It would directly penalise
those companies that have done nothing or too little to address the climate
crisis. Excluding these companies from CBPS would not just increase their
cost of borrowing through bond markets. It would entail adverse reputational
effects by sending a strong signal to markets that companies which fail to
contribute to the achievement of the Paris targets can suffer financially. Such
reputational consequences can increase the pressure on companies to decarbonise
their activities and fundamentally change their business models. In comparison,
such pressures are minimal under the Bank’s tilting option, whereby some
carbon-intensive companies could even benefit from the incorporation of climate
criteria into the Bank’s monetary framework.
Our proposals remain applicable should the Bank decide to taper its corporate
asset purchases in the coming months. For example, the Bank can implement
tapering by excluding from the eligible universe, or reducing the holdings of,
those bonds that have been issued by poor climate performers. A green tapering
would give a powerful signal to financial markets.
The climate emergency cannot be addressed through economic policies that
simply tinker around the edges. A sharp reduction in emissions requires
bold changes in the design of economic policies and the implementation of
unprecedented measures that will transform the structure of our financial
systems. As a powerful policy institution with a new environmental mandate, the
Bank of England should take up the challenge, lead by example, and contribute
decisively to the fight against climate change.
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1 Introduction
The Bank of England (BoE) has come under growing pressure to play its part in
the decarbonisation of the UK economy (see, e.g., Macquarie, 2018; Gabor et al.,
2019; Dafermos et al., 2020; van Lerven et al., 2021). Initially, it dismissed calls
for decarbonising its monetary policy, arguing that environmental sustainability
was not part of its mandate. This, however, changed in March 2021 when the UK
Government explicitly included the support for the transition to net zero in the
BoE mandate.1 In response, the Bank announced the greening of its Corporate
Bond Purchase Scheme (CBPS) by the end of 2021.2
Then, in May 2021 the BoE set out the general principles of its approach to
greening the CBPS.3 It acknowledged that the ‘market neutrality’ principle
– which allocates unconventional bond purchases according to the existing
sectoral composition in the bond market – is inconsistent with the environmental
mandate. The Bank echoed previous analyses showing that market neutrality
hardwires a carbon bias into the CBPS (see Matikainen et al., 2017; Dafermos et
al., 2020). This carbon bias implies that the CBPS may lower the cost of borrowing
(thus extending an implicit subsidy) and encourage more debt issuance by
carbon-intensive firms relative to low-carbon firms. In its current guise, the CBPS
reinforces market failures and the carbon lock-in, whilst undermining the goals
of the Paris Agreement.
The BoE outlined several tools to rebalance the carbon-intensive CBPS portfolio:
(i) portfolio targets for monitoring progress towards the decarbonisation of CBPS;
(ii) tilting, i.e. rebalancing of corporate bond purchases towards issuers that
perform relatively strong from a climate perspective; (iii) exclusion of bond issuers
whose activities are incompatible with climate neutrality; and (iv) escalation, a
strategy of introducing progressively more stringent measures – tilting, asset
exclusion and divestment – for issuers who do not improve their climate
performance.
In November 2021, the BoE provided further details about the greening of
its CBPS (Bank of England, 2021b). The Bank clarified that it will rely on a
climate scorecard for firms to tilt purchases within sectors without altering the
representation of sectors in its programme. This means that it will effectively
retain market neutrality, despite having recognised the problems of this principle
in the context of the climate crisis. The Bank also announced criteria for the
1See here the letter from the Chancellor to the BoE Governor: https://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/letter/2021/march/2021-mpc-remit-letter.pdf?la=en&
hash=C3A91905E1A58A3A98071B2DD41E65FAFD1CF03E.
2See the announcement of the Bank here: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2021/
march/mpc-remit-statement-and-letter-and-fpc-remit-letter.
3See Bank of England (2021a). For more information about the CBPS, see Appendix A.
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exclusion of companies from the CBPS eligible list, which however affect a very
small subset of carbon-intensive firms. The new framework is being deployed in
the Bank’s reinvestments between November 2021 and January 2022.
In this report, we assess the Bank’s approach to the greening of the CBPS
and propose alternatives. We argue that the Bank’s greening strategy has two
fundamental limitations. First, the Bank relies on a ‘carrots first, sticks later’
principle that precludes the introduction of any substantial penalties for poor
climate performers, at least at a first stage. Second, it continues to adhere to
the principle of market neutrality, which does not allow for the introduction of
substantial penalties for companies that engage in carbon-intensive activities.4
In short, the Bank’s approach lacks ambition: although it is nominally greener
than previous strategies, it will have relatively negligible effects on the overall
composition of the CBPS portfolio from a climate perspective.
Albeit the small size of the CBPS relative to the overall corporate bond market
(£20bn), the Bank’s strategy of postponement and delay sets a worrying standard
for financial markets. The BoE has the opportunity to create direct pressure
– via substantial penalties – on polluting companies. Its decision to waste
this opportunity is at odds with a precautionary or systemic risk approach to
climate change which emphasises that central banks should do ‘whatever it takes’
to prevent worst-case yet plausible scenarios of irreversible climate-induced
collapse of economic, financial and social systems.5
To capture empirically this lack of ambition, we replicate the key aspects of
the BoE’s tilting approach. We show that the BoE’s reliance on a climate
scorecard, which ignores the carbon footprint of the activities of bond issuers,
does not reduce the representation of carbon-intensive activities in the CBPS
and paradoxically leads to some carbon-intensive companies getting better
treatment than environmentally friendly ones. This is a direct consequence of
the BoE’s continued adherence to the market neutrality principle, which tilts
bond purchases according to climate scorecards within sectors, so that the CBPS
continues to replicate the underlying sectoral +sition of the bond market. For
example, the BoE would reduce the holdings of some fossil fuel bonds but would
increase purchases of bonds issued by other fossil fuel companies that perform
better in the same sector. Similarly, some environmentally friendly companies
would see a decline in the BoE holdings because they do not perform sufficiently
well according to the climate scorecard. For example, in our replication, the Bank
increases the holdings of bonds issued by BP PLC, a fossil fuel company, while
it reduces the holdings of bonds issued by Suez SA, an ‘Environmental services
4For the problems with the use of market neutrality in the design of monetary policies, see, for
example, Senni and Monnin (2020), van’t Klooster and Fontan (2020), Dafermos et al. (2021b)
and Robins et al. (2021).
5See Chenet et al. (2021) and Dafermos (2021).
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and equipment’ company.
Based on the BoE’s preferred indicator for the climate evaluation of its portfolio
– the Weighted Average Carbon Intensity (WACI) – we find that our replicated
BoE Tilting generates only a small decline in WACI compared to what is the case
before tilting (255 tCO2e/$m vs 237 tCO2e/$m) – a mere 7% change.
To help the BoE genuinely lead by example on the decarbonisation of monetary
policy, we propose two alternatives. The first alternative, the Strong Tilting
option, adds activities-based taxonomies into the tilting strategy and reallocates
purchases across different sectors without being restricted by the market
neutrality principle. In our second alternative, the Strong Tilting+Exclusion
option, we additionally exclude the bonds of fossil fuel companies and the bonds
issued by non-renewable electricity utilities with a poor climate performance.
Our Strong Tilting+Exclusion option reduces the WACI of the BoE by 39%. The
Bank, therefore, reduces its WACI by more than 25% now, instead of waiting
until 2025 for this to happen – as is its current plan. Moreover, under the Strong
Tilting option, the proportion of bonds issued by carbon-intensive companies
declines from 54% (pre-tilting) to 48%. This proportion declines even more, from
54% to 36%, under the Strong Tilting+Exclusion option. We argue that the Bank
needs to use these alternative approaches if it wants to substantively deliver on
its environmental mandate.
The report is structured as follows. In Section 2 we assess the Bank’s strategy
to green the CBPS, highlighting its lack of ambition in light of the new
environmental mandate. In Section 3 we explain how we capture the climate
footprint of bonds, setting the basis for the quantitative analysis of the BoE’s
tilting approach and our suggested alternatives. In Section 4 we present the
quantitative results of our replication and compare the BoE’s approach with
our alternatives. In Section 5 we discuss how these alternatives can affect the
low-carbon transition and explain why the exclusion of poor climate performers
should be a core feature of a climate-aligned CBPS – consistent with the Bank of
England’s new environmental mandate. In Section 6 we summarise the results
and our policy recommendations.
2 The Bank’s strategy for greening the CBPS:
‘carrots first, sticks later’ and market neutrality
The CBPS was first launched as a £10 billion corporate asset purchase
programme, part of a broader monetary stimulus package introduced in August
2016 to ease monetary conditions after the Brexit referendum. With the onset
of the COVID-19 pandemic, the BoE scaled corporate bond purchases up to £20
billion in March 2020.
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The Bank’s purchases directly increase the demand for eligible corporate bonds
(direct demand channel), pushing yields down. Purchases can also cause
a decline in the yields of other bonds/financial assets through a portfolio
rebalancing channel (the sellers of the bonds might use the money that they
receive to buy other assets) and through a liquidity channel (Bank purchases
increase liquidity in financial markets, leading to more trading of assets with a
high illiquidity premium).6 Empirical analyses have shown that the CBPS has
reduced corporate bond yields overall, and the yields of eligible bonds compared
to those that are not eligible (see Belsham et al., 2017; Boneva et al., 2018;
D’Amico and Kaminska, 2019). Lower yields can incentivise firms to increase
bond issuance and investment.
While some might suggest that £20 billion is comparatively low when contrasted
against other quantitative easing schemes, the BoE’s corporate bond purchases
have significant wider ‘signalling effects’ on the financial markets that should
not be downplayed. Given that the BoE is both a regulator and investor, the
signalling channel is particularly important from an environmental perspective
as it sends a powerful message to markets about the Bank’s views on specific
sectors and/or issuers.
The BoE has designed its corporate QE programme according to a ‘market
neutrality’ principle. It first stipulates a list of eligible bonds and then purchases
a portion of these bonds in line with the sectoral make-up of the eligible bond
market. The market neutrality principle seeks to ensure that purchases replicate
the existing sectoral composition of the market so as to minimise any distortion
of the CBPS on relative borrowing across sectors and activities. Problematically,
while the CBPS may be market neutral, it is not ‘climate neutral’. Replicating the
sectoral composition of the bond market also means replicating market failures
and the mispricing of assets in the age of the climate crisis. Consequently, the
CBPS ends up heavily biasing the allocation of capital towards carbon-intensive
sectors: it is well-documented that, based on their contribution to gross value
added (GVA) and employment, carbon-intensive sectors are over-represented in
the BoE’s list of eligible bonds.7 This carbon bias puts the CBPS at odds with the
government’s environmental objectives.
Prior to 2021, the BoE argued that it did not have the mandate to adequately
address the carbon bias its own policy was reinforcing. In March 2021, however,
the remit of the BoE was updated to explicitly reflect the government’s target of
achieving the transition to an environmentally sustainable and resilient net zero
economy.8 As the BoE puts it, the change to the remit ‘requires the Bank to review
6See, for example, Joyce et al. (2011), Belsham et al. (2017) and Boneva et al. (2018).
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the makeup of the CBPS’ (Bank of England, 2021a, p. 1).
Indeed, with the BoE’s new environmental mandate comes new opportunities.
The BoE can now incorporate climate criteria directly into its purchases without
having to stick to the climate-harming market neutrality principle. Rather than
undermining democratically defined climate goals, the BoE has the flexibility
to green the CBPS such that it maximises its contribution to the government’s
decarbonisation targets.
The toolkit for greening the CBPS includes four instruments (Bank of England,
2021a, 2021b):
1. climate targets for the CBPS portfolio;
2. eligibility according to climate criteria;
3. tilting holdings towards stronger climate performers; and
4. escalation through progressively tighter repercussions towards active
divestment (i.e. the selling of corporate bonds of issuers that, over time,
fail to meet standards of climate performance).
To ensure an ‘orderly transition’ the BoE intends to use this toolkit based on
a ‘carrots first, sticks later’ principle, which precludes the introduction of any
substantial penalties for poor climate performers, at least at a first stage (see Bank
of England, 2021a, 2021b). It also intends to guide tilting through the market
neutrality principle despite its incompatibility with climate neutrality. We discuss
the merits and limitations of the instruments in turn.
The Bank’s intermediate portfolio-level climate target: 25%
reduction in the CBPS WACI by 2025
The BoE plans to lower the carbon intensity of the CBPS portfolio by 25% until
2025, to then bring it to net zero by 2050. The Bank will use a backward-looking
metric to assess progress against the interim climate target: the Weighted
Average Carbon Intensity (WACI). The WACI has become a standard metric for
measuring the climate performance of portfolios. While its backward-looking
focus does not capture companies’ transition plans, the Bank has decided against
forward-looking portfolio metrics, since it believes they are not robust enough
to credibly anchor companies’ transition plans for the 2025 horizon. The Bank
will calculate the WACI of the CBPS portfolio using only Scope 1 and Scope 2
emissions, i.e. emissions generated directly by firms or during the production
of the energy that they use. It omits Scope 3 emissions (i.e. indirect emissions
linked with a company’s value chain), as it believes that data gaps do not permit
an accurate measurement of Scope 3 emissions at this stage.
While such portfolio-level targets are a welcome first step towards correcting
the CBPS’s carbon bias, this by itself is insufficient. Without explicitly taking
aim at sectors that engage in carbon-intensive activities, like fossil fuel and
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non-renewable utilities, through say sectoral targets, portfolio-level targets are
a black box. The missed opportunity to reduce subsidies to climate laggards will
be further reinforced by the Bank’s decision to preserve the principle of market
neutrality.
Green eligibility
Before its environmental mandate, the BoE did not consider the climate footprint
of bond issuers as a relevant criterion for determining the universe of bonds
eligible for purchase. It rather focused on standard criteria like the investment
grade and the size of issuance (see Appendix A). It now plans to use a ‘phased’
approach that would eventually only deem eligible those bonds issued by
companies with climate investment plans credibly aligned with the 2050 net zero
transition and verified by an appropriate third party.
The November 2021 announcement specified two green eligibility requirements
(see Bank of England, 2021b): climate disclosures/decarbonisation targets and
compatibility of companies’ activities with net zero. The BoE will impose
mandatory climate-related financial disclosures after April 2022 for all firms
with over 500 employees and a turnover of over £500 million.9 It will accept a
broad range of disclosure formats that are in line with the TCFD (Task Force on
Climate-related Financial Disclosures) recommendations. These include: CDP
(formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project), the Sustainable Accounting Standards
Board and International Integrated Reporting Framework (now collectively
known as the Value Reporting Foundation, VRF), the Carbon Disclosure
Standards Board and the Global Reporting Initiative. Additionally, starting with
the November 2021 round, it will make bonds ineligible for issuers that (i)
belong to high-emitting sectors (energy, electricity, gas and water) and have not
published an emissions reduction target, (ii) generate any revenue using mining
thermal coal or (iii) generate any revenue using thermal coal unless they meet a
set of specific criteria.10
The Bank thus effectively introduces immediate restrictions only on specific
coal mining activities (in line with the government’s plan to eliminate coal-fired
power generation by 2025), albeit recognising that this would have a very limited
impact on its portfolio since coal usage is very low in the UK (Bank of England,
2021b, p. 45). It postpones the exclusion of bonds linked to other fossil fuels.
This soft approach to the elimination of high-carbon bonds from the Bank’s list of
eligible assets is inconsistent with the climate emergency that we are facing. Given the
9This is in line with the UK Government’s recent decision about mandatory climate disclosures.
See Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2021).
10These crteria include: no investment in new unabated thermal coal plants; commitments for
the elimination of existing thermal coal activity; reduction of emissions over time in line with
sectoral net zero pathways; a minimum presence of renewable energy in the energy mix.
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potential catastrophic and irreversible losses from climate change, alongside the
fundamental uncertainty and systemic nature of climate risks, a precautionary
approach is warranted so that the burden of proof is shifted: the Bank should
exclude fossil fuel bonds unless scientific evidence categorically suggests they do
not represent a systemic risk to the climate and financial systems.
Tilting
The BoE will use a scorecard to evaluate issuers’ climate performance and then
tilt purchases towards strong climate performers.11 The scorecard relies on four
metrics:
1. The current carbon intensity of companies: This is a backward-looking metric
that compares the carbon intensity of bond issuers (expressed in Scope 1
and Scope 2 carbon dioxide emissions per million pounds of revenue) with
the WACI of the CBPS.
2. Past change in absolute emissions: This is the second backward-looking metric
that the Bank employs. It compares companies’ rate of reduction in absolute
emissions over the last three years with the reduction in emissions that is
necessary in 1.5oC transition pathways. The Bank assigns the same weight
to metric (1) and metric (2).
3. Climate disclosures: The Bank gives credit to companies that have made
climate-related financial disclosures. The weight given to the metric is
higher in sectors with higher levels of disclosure. The bank deems climate
disclosures as a forward-looking metric.
4. Emissions reduction target: In this second forward-looking metric, the Bank
gives credit to firms that have a target for the reduction in emissions in
the future. The credit is higher if there is a third-party validation of the
target. As in metric (3), the weight depends positively on the proportion of
companies that have set a target.
Note that while the Bank decided against the use of forward-looking metrics for
its 2025 portfolio-level decarbonisation target, it uses forward-looking metrics
for tilting its purchases. This introduces an inconsistency: the portfolio target
for 2025 is directly linked only with the backward-looking metric (1), but tilting
will rely on a broader set of metrics that capture forward-looking perspectives as
well. This inconsistency might affect the ability of the Bank to deliver on its 2025
ambitions.
The BoE allocates firms to four buckets on the basis of the climate scorecard
(very strong, strong, poor and very poor performers). Importantly, the Bank
envisages tilting purchases within sectors, planning to purchase relatively more of
the debt issued by issuers that perform better according to its climate scorecard,
11For the use of tilting in the greening of monetary policy, see Schoenmaker (2021).
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but without altering the sector allocation of its purchases set by the principle
of market neutrality. Its purchases will simply reorient from poor performers
(defined by the climate scorecard) to stronger performers within sectors. While
this policy choice may reflect its concern to deflect criticism that it engages in
credit allocation,12 we show in the next sections that it can lead to plausible
scenarios that generate perverse outcomes where carbon-intensive companies get
better treatment than green companies, preserving the carbon bias.
Escalation
The BoE escalation approach explicitly favours light positive tilts over steep
negative tilts, exclusions and divestment during the first stage of its greening
process. Stricter repercussions might be considered only at a later stage. The
Bank argues that this gradual ‘carrots first, sticks later’ approach is better aligned
with an orderly transition because ‘Big Bang’ divestment or exclusions would
reduce the BoE’s influence over polluters. It also argues that increasing the cost
of borrowing for poor climate performers might be counter-productive because
these companies need to get better access to finance to be able to undertake
low-carbon investment and reduce their emissions (see Bank of England, 2021a,
2021b).
However, these arguments are misplaced for at least two reasons. First, a small
reduction in the cost of borrowing of carbon-intensive companies might prove
insufficient to make these companies change: it might still be more profitable for
them to continue using their carbon-intensive assets and fossil fuel resources.13
Penalties can provide a much stronger signal to the financial markets, creating
more pressure on firms to decarbonise. Second, in designing its escalation
approach, the Bank implicitly uses the November 2021 announcement as the
starting point for evaluating decarbonisation efforts. However, carbon-intensive
firms have known for years (even decades) that their activities are responsible
for the climate crisis. It is unclear why the Bank should give them more time,
especially given that we cannot afford new investment in fossil fuel supply if we
are to limit the rise in global temperatures to 1.5 °C (see e.g. IEA, 2021; SEI et al.,
2021).
In the following sections, we outline tilting alternatives that are not restricted by
the market neutrality and the ‘carrots first, sticks later’ principles. This allows us
to map out more ambitious options for decarbonisation.
12See Bezemer et al. (2021).
13See also Youel (2021).
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3 Identifying the climate footprint of bonds
A first crucial step in designing options for greening the CBPS is to identify the
climate footprint of bonds. To replicate the BoE approach (see Bank of England,
2021b), we use the following backward-looking and forward-looking metrics14 at
a company level:15
1. the carbon intensity of the bond issuer compared to the Weighted Average
Carbon Intensity (WACI) of the Bank of England portfolio;
2. the decarbonisation that the bond issuer has achieved over the last three
years compared to the reduction of emissions that is necessary according to
1.5oC transition pathways;
3. whether the bond issuer has an emissions reduction target or not.16
We allocate firms to four different climate buckets (A: very strong climate
performers; B: strong climate performers; C: poor climate performers; D: very
poor climate performers) for each one of these metrics. Then, we weight the
buckets together to allocate firms to an overall climate category.17
14Backward-looking and forward-looking metrics about the climate footprint of companies have
both advantages and disadvantages (see also TCFD, 2021a; Bank of England, 2021a). The key
advantage of backward-looking metrics is that they capture the actual climate performance of firms
and their interpretation is straightforward. However, they do not consider the plans that firms
might have about the reduction of their climate footprint in the coming years. Forward-looking
metrics consider the future plans of firms, but they might over-rely on the promises of companies
about their decarbonisation, which might not be credible. In addition, some forward-looking
metrics (like the Implied Temperature Rise) require several assumptions about the allocation of
carbon budgets and have to rely on climate scenarios (see e.g. Raynaud et al., 2020; TCFD, 2021a).
Some of these assumptions might be arbitrary, the results might be quite sensitive to changes
in these assumptions, and the reliance on scenarios might make the analysis quite complicated,
making it difficult for these metrics to be used as a basis for policy decision making. The BoE
and our quantitative analysis rely on relatively simple forward-looking metrics that confine their
attention to the decarbonisation plans of firms, avoiding some of the limitations of forward-looking
approaches.
15We do not have access to data that allow us to use a metric that captures climate-related
financial disclosures.
16We do not have access to data that allow us to distinguish between validated and non-validated
targets.
17The information provided by the Bank of England (2021b) is not detailed enough to allow
us to perfectly replicate their climate scorecard. Moreover, the database that we use (Refinitiv
Eikon) is not the same as the databases that the BoE uses to apply its climate scorecard. Despite
this, our replicated classification of firms into climate buckets does not differ very significantly
from the BoE categorisation, which is available here: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-
/media/boe/files/markets/greening-cbps/percentage-of-firms-on-the-cbps-eligible-list-across-
scorecard-categories.pdf?la=en&hash=AE3A75897EFF58A73FD602146CD2792560CD09C5. In
our replication, the proportion of eligible issuers in each climate bucket are 18% (A), 22% (B),
37% (C) and 23% (D), while in the BoE climate scorecard these proportions are 9% (A), 42% (B),
34% (C) and 15% (D).
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In the Strong Tilting and Strong Tilting+Exclusion options, we use a slightly
different way to determine the climate buckets of the bond issuers. Based on
Dafermos et al. (2021a), we construct a Company Climate Index (CCI) that is a
weighted average of the company-level climate metrics. The metrics are similar
as in the BoE climate scorecard. However, there are two differences. First, in
calculating (1) we compare the carbon intensity of bond issuers with the carbon
intensity of their peers. This is more reasonable given (i) the large diversity in the
mean value of carbon intensity across different sectors and (ii) the fact that Scope
3 emissions have not been included in our analysis, making the comparison of
carbon intensity across sectors less meaningful.18 Second, in calculating (3) the
emissions reduction target is evaluated based on how close the target is to the
decarbonisation rate that is needed according to 1.5oC transition pathways (see
Appendix B for further details).
The CCI takes values between 0 and 2 – the higher the value of the CCI, the worse
the climate performance of the company. We classify companies into four climate
buckets as follows:
 Bucket A (very strong climate performers): 0≤ CCI<0.5
 Bucket B (strong climate performers): 0.5≤ CCI<1
 Bucket C (poor climate performers): 1≤ CCI<1.5
 Bucket D (very poor climate performers): 1.5≤ CCI≤2
Table 1 summarises the differences between the replicated BoE climate scorecard
and our climate scorecard. More details about the formulas and the data that we
use in these scorecards are provided in Appendix B.
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In the Strong Tilting and Strong Tilting+Exclusion options, we do not, however,
only rely on the company-level climate buckets. We also take into account the
main activity that the companies engage in. We do so because two companies
18The volume of Scope 3 emissions differs substantially across sectors (see TCFD, 2021b).
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that are in the same climate bucket might have a different climate footprint
depending on what their main activities are. For example, a fossil fuel company
that has a better climate performance compared to other fossil fuel companies
has a much higher climate footprint relative to a renewable energy company that
might happen to be in the same climate bucket. We, therefore, consider whether a
bond has been issued by a company whose primary activity is carbon-intensive or
a company whose primary activity is (potentially) green. On top of this, we take
into account whether a bond has a ‘green bond’ label to reflect the fact that some
bonds can directly finance projects that support the transition to a low-carbon
economy. For more details about our activities-based categorisation of bonds, see
Appendix C.
According to our approach, carbon-intensive companies that wish to reduce the
climate footprint of their bonds – and, therefore, get a better treatment in the
CBPS – can do so via three interconnected ways. First, they can take action to
improve their CCI, for example, by reducing their emissions. Second, they can
change their business model in a fundamental way. For instance, non-renewable
electricity utilities can be transformed into renewable ones through ambitious
low-carbon investments that would make renewables-related activities the main
source of their revenues. Both actions could improve the climate footprint of their
standard bonds. A third way would be for them to issue green bonds to finance
specific decarbonisation projects.
4 How to green the CBPS: the Bank of England’s
approach vs alternatives
We analyse the Bank of England’s approach to the greening to the CBPS and we
compare it with two alternatives:19
1. BoE Tilting: To replicate the Bank of England’s approach we use the BoE
climate scorecard described in the previous section to allocate firms to four
different buckets. We then simulate the BoE’s tilted purchases towards
stronger climate performers. The rebalancing of the portfolio takes place
within sectors to keep market neutrality. The purchases of bonds issued by
companies with a stronger climate performance in the scorecard increase,
while the purchases of bonds issued by companies with a poorer climate
performance in the scorecard decrease, irrespective of the main activity of
the companies.
2. Strong Tilting: The BoE rebalances its holdings based both on the CCI
and the climate impact of the main activities of the bond issuers. Under
this option, all the holdings of bonds issued by companies that engage in
19The formulas that we use are reported in Appendix D.
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carbon-intensive activities decline (with the exception of green bonds), but
the decline is lower for those companies that perform better based on the
CCI. Similarly, the BoE increases the holdings of bonds issued by companies
engaging in green activities, but the increase is less for those companies
that have a relatively poor performance based on the CCI. Compared to the
BoE tilting, this option does not, therefore, retain market neutrality. The
tilting in the holdings that refer to the companies that are neither green nor
carbon-intensive follows a similar rationale as in the BoE Tilting option.
3. Strong Tilting+Exclusion: This is the same as the Strong Tilting option
with the additional feature that the bonds of fossil fuel companies and
the bonds issued by non-renewable electricity utilities with a poor climate
performance are excluded, while new climate-friendly bonds and other
non-carbon-intensive bonds (which are included in the list of eligible bonds)
are purchased by the BoE.
BoE Tilting
Figure 1, first column, shows the decomposition of the Bank’s pre-tilting holdings
by climate bucket. According to our replication, poor and very poor climate
performers account for about 61% of the total BoE holdings. The BoE Tilting
approach reduces marginally the representation of bonds that are issued by poor
and very poor climate performers (to about 56%) and increases the representation
of bonds issued by strong and very strong climate performers (see the second
column in Figure 1).
Figure 2 shows the sectoral decomposition of the pre-tilting and BoE Tilting
holdings, using the nine sector-classification that the Bank relies on to apply
the market neutrality principle. Our replication follows the market neutrality
principle since holdings per sector in the BoE Tilting option remain the same
as before tilting. Purchases are reallocated towards stronger climate performers
within sectors. However, the poor and very poor climate performers can only
be penalised in sectors in which they co-exist with some strong or very strong
performers. Similarly, the holdings of strong and very strong climate performers
can only increase in sectors in which they co-exist with poor or very poor
performers. In our replication the latter is not the case in the ‘Communications’
sector (see Figure 2): the Bank cannot increase its support to strong and
very strong climate performers since this would violate the market neutrality
principle.20
Market neutrality also implies that the BoE Tilting approach ignores companies’
activities. Tilting relies only on the climate buckets of companies which do not
20A different design of our replication could reallocate purchases from strong to very strong
climate performers so that tilting would still take place in the ‘Communications’ sector. However,
this would be unfair for the strong climate performers in this sector and could undermine the net
zero transition.
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Figure 1: Decomposition of CBPS holdings by climate bucket, pre-tilting and BoE
Tilting
Source: BoE (bond ISIN codes, 5 November 2021), Refinitiv Eikon (bond outstanding amount, November 2021;
financial and environmental variables) and authors’ calculations
take into account whether companies’ main activities are carbon-intensive or
climate friendly. As a result, some carbon-intensive companies, which happen
to perform better than their sectoral peers, might be treated more favourably
than companies that engage in climate friendly activities in other sectors. For
example, in our replication, BP PLC – a fossil fuel company – is allocated to
climate bucket B (strong climate performer), while Suez SA – an ‘Environmental
services and equipment’ company21 – is allocated to climate bucket D (very poor
climate performer). Under the BoE Tilting approach, the Bank of England would
increase the purchases of BP PLC bonds and reduce the purchases of Suez SA
bonds.
Strong Tilting
The Strong Tilting option penalises carbon-intensive companies: the BoE would
purchase a lower proportion of their bonds (albeit the decline in purchases would
be lower for companies that have a relatively low CCI). At the same time, the BoE
would purchase a higher amount of bonds issued by companies that engage in
21Based on its TRBC industry.
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Figure 2: Decomposition of CBPS holdings by climate bucket and Bank of England
sectors, pre-tilting and BoE Tilting
Source: BoE (bond ISIN codes, 5 November 2021), Refinitiv Eikon (bond outstanding amount, November 2021;
financial and environmental variables) and authors’ calculations
potentially green activities or issue green bonds (but the increase in purchases
would be lower for companies that have a relatively high CCI).
In Figure 3 and Figure 4 we compare the BoE Tilting with our Strong Tilting option.
Under Strong Tilting, the purchases of bonds issued by companies that engage
in carbon-intensive activities decline, and vice versa for the purchases of debt
issued by environmentally friendly companies. Contrast this with the BoE Tilting
approach whereby it is possible for the purchases of bonds of carbon-intensive
companies to increase and the purchases of the bonds of environmentally friendly
companies to decline. For example, as shown in Figure 3, in the BoE Tilting option,
the holdings of carbon-intensive transportation bonds increase on average by
6.9% and the holdings of energy-intensive bonds increase by 4.6%, in contrast
to what happens in the Strong Tilting option, where the holdings of these bonds
decline by 6.6% and 10.7%, respectively. Additionally, the holdings of bonds
issued by potentially green information companies and potentially green utilities
decline by 1.1% and 6.8%, respectively, in the BoE Tilting option, while they
increase by 37.0% and 19.3%, respectively, in the Strong Tilting option.
Figure 4 zooms in on the carbon-intensive activities. Under the BoE Tilting
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Figure 3: Average percentage change (%) in the CBPS holdings per activity, BoE
Tilting and Strong Tilting
Source: BoE (bond ISIN codes, 5 November 2021), Refinitiv Eikon (bond outstanding amount, November 2021;
NACE 4-digit codes; TRBC codes; financial and environmental variables) and authors’ calculations
approach, the BoE purchases a higher amount of carbon-intensive bonds issued
by companies that perform relatively better from a climate perspective. For some
bonds, the percentage increase in the CBPS holdings is higher than 20%. On
the contrary, the Strong Tilting approach penalises all fossil fuel bonds (i.e. the
percentage change in purchases is negative), and other carbon-intensive bonds.
The only case in which the purchases of the bonds of carbon-intensive companies
increase under Strong Tilting is when these bonds are green: the increase in the
purchases of specific bonds of non-renewable utilities, shown in Figure 4b, is due
to the fact that these bonds are green.
Strong Tilting+Exclusion
Figure 5 illustrates the key advantages of the Strong Tilting+Exclusion option
over the other options. The figure shows how the composition and the value of
corporate bond purchases changes under the three options. By design, all three
preserve the existing value of CBPS holdings (close to £19.4 billion as of early
December).
The Weighted Average Carbon Intensity (WACI) in the BoE Tilting (237
17
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Figure 4: Number of bonds per band of percentage change (%) in CBPS
holdings, fossil fuel, non-renewable utility, energy-intensive and carbon-intensive
transportation companies, BoE Tilting and Strong Tilting




Note: Each bar shows the number of bonds that see a specific percentage change in the CBPS holdings under the
BoE Tilting and Strong Tilting options. For example, Figure 4a, which refers to fossil fuel activities, shows that
the BoE Tilting reduces the holdings of 8 bonds by 0-10%, the holdings of 16 bonds by 10-20% and the holdings of
1 bond by 20-30%, while it increases the holdings of 3 bonds by 10-20% and the holding of 1 bond by 20-30%. The
same figure shows that Strong Tilting reduces the holdings of 12 bonds by 0-10% and the holdings of 17 bonds by
10-20%.
Source: BoE (bond ISIN codes, 5 November 2021), Refinitiv Eikon (bond outstanding amount, November 2021;
NACE 4-digit codes; TRBC codes; financial and environmental variables) and authors’ calculations
tCO2e/$m) is lower than the WACI before tilting (255 tCO2e/$m).22 However, the
22The WACI is calculated by taking the average carbon intensity that corresponds to each bond
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WACI declines much more under the Strong Tilting and Strong Tilting+Exclusion
options. Strong Tilting+Exclusion would reduce the WACI of the BoE by more
than 25% now instead of 2025, the intermediary target of the BoE (the exact
percentage reduction in WACI is 39%). Moreover, under the Strong Tilting option,
the proportion of bonds issued by carbon-intensive companies declines from 54%
(Pre-tilting) to 48%, but this proportion declines even more, from 54% to 36%,
under the Strong Tilting+Exclusion option.
Figure 5: Decomposition of CPBS holdings by activity (in £ billions), and weighted
average carbon intensity (WACI) (in tCO2e/$m), pre-tilting and green options
Note: The figures above each bar show the WACI.
Source: BoE (bond ISIN codes, 5 November 2021), Refinitiv Eikon (bond outstanding amount, November 2021;
NACE 4-digit codes; TRBC codes; financial and environmental variables) and authors’ calculations
The proportion of bonds issued by carbon-intensive companies in the BoE
Tilting remains almost the same. This is so because the BoE Tilting option
reallocates purchases within sectors to respect market neutrality, so there is only
a small change in the allocation of holdings between carbon-intensive, green and
other sectors. The WACI, however, declines, since the holdings of the bonds
of carbon-intensive companies with a strong climate scorecard performance
weighted by the proportion of the tilted holdings of the bond in the total tilted bond holdings.
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increase, while the holdings of other carbon-intensive sectors with a relatively
poor climate performance decline.
5 How can our proposals affect climate
neutrality?
Greening the CBPS can affect decarbonisation efforts through two channels.
The direct demand channel, which also applies to the standard corporate
QE programmes, directly benefits companies that are eligible in the CBPS
programme through a reduction in yields on their bonds. These companies could
increase bond issuance to finance investment. By increasing the purchases of
climate-friendly bonds and reducing holdings of carbon-intensive bonds, the BoE
can create more favourable conditions for the financing of green investments and
increase the cost of borrowing for carbon-intensive companies.
We describe the second channel as the climate signalling channel. By identifying
which companies perform better/worse than others from a climate perspective,
the BoE can give strong signals about how these companies will be perceived by
central banks and financial markets as the fight against climate change intensifies.
Companies that the Bank identifies as better climate performers can be treated
in more favourable terms by financial markets as well as their stakeholders
compared to companies that will, for example, be excluded from the CBPS
because of their poor climate performance. This can affect companies’ access
to finance and their overall economic performance. The existence of signalling
effects is well recognised for central banks’ monetary policies.
The Strong Tilting+Exclusion option is likely to have the strongest impact on
decarbonisation through these channels. It would directly penalise those
companies that have done nothing or too little to address the climate crisis.
Excluding these companies from CBPS would not only increase their cost of
borrowing on the bond market. It would also harm their reputation, giving a very
strong signal to markets that companies that fail to contribute to the achievement
of the targets of the Paris Agreement can suffer financially. This has the potential
to significantly increase the pressure on these companies to decarbonise their
activities and change fundamentally their business plans. Such pressure would
be lower under the Strong Tilting option whereby carbon-intensive companies
would be penalised but not be excluded from the BoE purchases. And it
would be very low under the BoE Tilting option, whereby carbon-intensive
companies could even benefit from the incorporation of climate criteria into the
QE programme.
Crucially, our alternatives encourage carbon-intensive companies to avoid an
increase in their cost of borrowing in the short run by issuing green bonds and
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designing credible decarbonisation plans. In the medium run, they can reduce
any CBPS-induced increase in their cost of borrowing if they manage to reduce
emissions and change their business model.
6 Conclusion
The change in the mandate of the Bank of England gives a significant opportunity
to the Bank to play a leading role in the decarbonisation of monetary policy, in
line with the climate emergency that we are facing. However, this opportunity
might be squandered if the Bank proceeds with its light ‘carrots first, sticks
later’ approach and continues to adhere to the principle of market neutrality.
On the contrary, what the Bank needs to do is to adopt, without delay, a strict
attitude against polluting companies that have a historical responsibility for the
climate crisis, are incompatible with the net zero transition and lack Paris-aligned
decarbonisation plans.
Our quantitative analysis showed that the combination of a strong tilting
approach with the exclusion of highly polluting companies would quickly reduce
the WACI of the CBPS and has the potential to maximise the contribution of the
Bank to the fight against climate change in line with its new secondary mandate.
At the same time, it would not reduce the overall holdings of the Bank and would,
therefore, not undermine its primary price stability mandate.
The benefits of our recommendations would not only materialise through the
direct demand channel, which is likely to be relatively weak given the small
size of the CBPS. The implementation of our proposals would most crucially
affect decarbonisation via the climate signalling channel: the Bank would send a
clear message to financial markets that it would stop purchasing the bonds of
companies that have done nothing or too little to achieve the democratically
defined goals of the Paris Agreement. Leading by example through such a
decision the Bank would not only inspire the wider investment and central
banking community, but would also help create a much-needed pressure
on polluting companies to take decisive climate action as soon as possible.
In contrast, the current approach of the BoE, which adheres to the market
neutrality principle, does not necessarily penalise carbon-intensive companies
and postpones any significant exclusions for later, is unlikely to have a significant
contribution to decarbonisation. Indeed, the signal of ‘postponement’ and
‘delay’ of decarbonisation to financial markets sets a deeply worrying standard
unbefitting one of the world’s most powerful financial institution.
More broadly, the way that the Bank assesses the climate performance of bond
issuers does not only affect the design of the CBPS (and the wider structure of
UK financial markets). It is likely to be used as a benchmark by other central
banks around the globe for the greening of their own monetary and financial
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policy tools. It is therefore important for the BoE to get it right.
Our proposals would still be applicable in the case that the BoE decides to taper
its corporate asset purchases in the coming months. For example, the BoE can
implement tapering by excluding from the eligible universe, or reducing the
holdings of, those bonds that have been issued by poor climate performers. This
would give a powerful signal to the financial markets.
In this report, we have overall shown how the Bank of England can adopt an
ambitious approach to the greening of its CBPS. Our proposals reflect the fact
that, in the age of the climate emergency, it is important that firms take higher
climate responsibilities: the burden of proof that they take climate consistent
actions should lie primarily on them and less on policy institutions that evaluate
them.
The climate emergency will not be addressed through marginal changes in
economic policy making that simply tinker around the edges. A sharp reduction
in emissions requires fundamentally bold changes in macrofinancial policies. As
a powerful policy institution with a new environmental mandate, the Bank of
England should take up the challenge, lead by example, and contribute decisively
to the fight against climate change.
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Appendix A: The BoE’s eligibility list and the
CBPS holdings
The Bank implements the Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme (CBPS) via a
two-step process. First, it specifies a list of eligible bonds based on criteria related
primarily to the maturity of bonds, their investment grade, the amount in issue
and the contribution of bond issuers to the UK economy (the exact criteria are
reported below). Second, a proportion of these eligible bonds are purchased,
applying the market neutrality principle. In practice, this means that the Bank
estimates the contribution of different sectors to the universe of eligible bonds
and buys bonds such that the share of each sector in purchases is close to its
share in the eligible bond universe.
The main bond eligibility criteria set by the BoE for the CBPS are as follows:
1. the bond should have been issued in sterling by companies that are not
subject to financial sector regulation;
2. the residual maturity of the bond is at least three months and the bond
was issued at least one month before the BoE list of eligible bonds was
published;
3. the bond should be rated investment grade; and
4. the amount in issue should be at least £100 million.23
The BoE provides the list of bonds that are eligible according to its criteria. We use
the list that was published on 5 November 2021. The BoE also provides a list that
includes the names of the issuers whose bonds are held in the CBPS portfolio (as
at 3 November 2021), without, however, reporting which bonds of these issuers
are held and the corresponding amount.24 Thus, to replicate the CBPS portfolio,
we assume that (i) all the eligible bonds of the issuers included in the CBPS
holdings are held by the BoE and (ii) the proportion of the outstanding amount
of each bond that has been purchased is the same for all bonds. To estimate
this proportion we divide the total holdings of the BoE as at 1 December 2021
(approximately equal to £19.5bn) by the total amount of all the eligible bonds
included in the CBPS. This gives a proportion approximately equal to 0.145. We
call this proportion the ‘holding factor’.
The BoE list of eligible bonds comprises 430 bonds whose outstanding amount
23There are some additional criteria according to which the bonds (i) should be cleared and
settled through Euroclear and/or Clearstream, (ii) need to be admitted to official listing on an EU
stock exchange and (iii) need to be conventional senior unsecured or secured, unsubordinated
debt. For more details, see https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/market-notices/2020/
asset-purchase-facility-additional-corporate-bond-purchases; see also https://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/markets/market-notices/2020/apf-pricing-of-cbps-eligible-securities-june-2020.
24Both lists are available here: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/bank-of-england-
market-operations-guide/information-for-participants.
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is £165bn. As explained in Appendix C, our analysis requires the identification
of the 4-digit NACE code and the Refinitiv Business Classification (TRBC) code
of the bond issuer. Therefore, we exclude those bonds for which the NACE or
TRBC codes are not available in Refinitiv Eikon. The ultimate number of eligible
bonds that we use in our analysis is 408 (with an outstanding amount of £159bn).
Moreover, we have managed to match 100 out of the 111 issuers in the CBPS
holdings with issuers in the BoE list of eligible bonds. Hence, our analysis of
CBPS holdings is confined to these 100 issuers that have issued 328 eligible bonds
(with an outstanding amount of £134bn).
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Appendix B: Climate scorecards
The replicated Bank of England climate scorecard
To replicate the Bank of England’s (2021b) climate scorecard, we calculate the
following metrics for each company:25
(1) Relative Carbon Intensity based on the CBPS WACI (RCIWACI): This relies on
the carbon intensity of each company compared to the WACI of the Bank of
England’s CBPS portfolio. We use the company-level carbon intensity provided
by Refinitiv Eikon, which is equal to the sum of Scope 1 and Scope 2 CO2
equivalent GHG emissions (in tonnes) over the company revenues (in $ millions)
– we use the data for the last available fiscal year. The carbon intensity of each
company j (CIj) is compared with the WACI of the pre-tilting holdings of the








(2) Relative Backward-looking Decarbonisation Rate (RBDR): This is defined based
on the average annual percentage decline in emissions over the last three years,
which we call the Backward-looking Decarbonisation Rate (BDR). We use Scope
1 and Scope 2 emissions from Refinitiv Eikon and give a higher weight to more
recent data. To calculate the Relative Backward-looking Decarbonisation Rate
for company j we compare the BDR with DRALIGNED, which is the annual
decarbonisation rate that is aligned with a 1.5oC transition pathway according
to Teske et al. (2020) – we use sector-specific pathways when available. This is
the formula that we use:
RBDRj =
{









The formula suggests that RBDR = 0 when a company has achieved a
decarbonisation rate that is at least twice higher than the climate-aligned rate
(i.e. BDR ≥ 2DRALIGNED), RBDR = 1 when the past decarbonisation rate
is equal to the climate-aligned rate (i.e. BDR = DRALIGNED) and RBDR = 2
when BDR ≤ 0. Note that when Refinitiv Eikon reports no data about the past
reduction of emissions for a company, we set RBDR = 2.
(3) Emissions Reduction Target (ERT ): This takes a value of 0 when a company
has reported an emissions reduction target and 2 otherwise.
25For the companies that engage in financial and insurance activities (NACE codes K.64, K.65
and K.66), we use the company-level data that correpond to their ultimate parents.
26If Refinitiv Eikon does not provide data for the carbon intensity of a company, we use as a
proxy the median intensity of the companies that belong to the same TRBC business sector.
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We allocate firms to four different buckets (A,B,C,D) for each one of these metrics.
In particular:
 Bucket A (very strong climate performers): 0 ≤ RCIWACI , RBDR,ERT <
0.5
 Bucket B (strong climate performers): 0.5 ≤ RCIWACI , RBDR,ERT < 1
 Bucket C (poor climate performers): 1 ≤ RCIWACI , RBDR,ERT < 1.5
 Bucket D (very poor climate performers): 1.5 ≤ RCIWACI , RBDR,ERT ≤ 2
Then, we weight the buckets together to allocate firms to an overall climate
category. Following the Bank of England (2021b), we use sector-specific
weights.27 The weights w1s and w2s, which correspond to RCIWACI and RBDR,
respectively, are the same, while w3s, which corresponds to ERT , is higher the
higher is the proportion of companies in sector s that report emission reduction
targets. In particular:
w1s = w2s = (1 − w3s)/2
w3s = (1/3)props
where props is the proportion of eligible companies in sector s that have reported
decarbonisation targets.
Our climate scorecard
Our climate scorecard relies on the Climate Company Index (CCI). For each
company j the CCI is given by:
CCIj = w1sRCIPEERS,j + w2sRBDRj + w3sRFDRj (3)
where RCIPEERS is the Relative Carbon Intensity that is defined based on the
carbon inensity of a company’s peers, RBDR is the Relative Backward-looking
Decarbonisation Rate, RFDR is the Relative Forward-looking Decarbonisation Rate,
and w1s, w2s and w3s are sector-specific weights. The sector-specific weights
and RBDR are defined as in the Bank of England climate scorecard. The rest
components of the CCI are defined below.
RCIPEERS : The carbon intensity of each company (CIj) is compared with the
carbon intensity of its peers in the Refinitiv Eikon database (peers are defined as
those companies that belong to the same TRBC business sector). The formula that








27We rely on the nine-sector classification of the Bank of England.
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RFDR: The Forward-looking Decarbonisation Rate (FDR) is defined as the
annual targeted percentage reduction in Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions of the
bond issuer in the coming years (based on data from Refinitiv Eikon). To calculate
the Relative Forward-looking Decarbonisation Rate for company j we compare
the FDR with DRALIGNED, which is the annual decarbonisation rate that is
aligned with 1.5oC transition pathways. In particular:
RFDRj =
{









According to this formula, RFDR = 0 when a company has a target for its
decarbonisation rate that is at least twice ambitious as the climate-aligned target
(i.e. FDR ≥ 2DRALIGNED), RFDR = 1 when the target decarbonisation rate
is equal to the climate-aligned rate (i.e. FDR = DRALIGNED) and RFDR = 2
when the target is to keep the emissions at the same level as they are right now
(i.e. FDR = 0). Note that when the company has no target according to Refinitiv
Eikon, we set RFDR = 2.
The CCI has been constructed such that it takes values between 0 and 2: 0
corresponds to the strongest climate performance (i.e. the climate damage caused
by the company is at its minimum level), and 2 corresponds to the poorest climate
performance (i.e. the climate damage caused by the company is at its maximum
level).
We classify companies into 4 different climate buckets (A, B, C, D) based on their
CCI as follows:
 Bucket A (very strong climate performers): 0 ≤ CCI < 0.5
 Bucket B (strong climate performers): 0.5 ≤ CCI < 1
 Bucket C (poor climate performers): 1 ≤ CCI < 1.5
 Bucket D (very poor climate performers): 1.5 ≤ CCI ≤ 2
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Appendix C: Activities-based categorisation of
bonds
Bonds are classified into three categories based on the main activity of their
issuers 28 and whether they have a green label or not:
1. CIA bonds: these are bonds issued by companies that engage in
carbon-intensive activities (CIA).
2. GREEN bonds: these are bonds that have a green bond flag in Refinitiv
Eikon29 or the main activity of their issuers is ’potentially green’.
3. OTHER bonds: these are bonds that do not belong to any of the above
categories, i.e. they do not have a green flag in Refinitiv Eikon and the
activity of their issuers is not classified as carbon-intensive or potentially
green.
We explain below how we identify carbon-intensive and potentially green
activities using the NACE classification and the Refinitiv Business Classification
(TRBC).
Carbon-intensive activities
We identify carbon-intensive activities drawing on Battiston and Monasterolo
(2019). Our starting point is the NACE-based Climate Policy Relevant Sectors
(CPRS) classification, first presented in Battiston et al. (2017).30 This classification
specifies sectors that can be affected by climate policies and are subject to climate
transition risks. However, not all of these sectors are necessarily carbon-intensive.
Battiston and Monasterolo (2019) have identified carbon-intensive sectors, which
are a subset of CPRS. We have, therefore, specified NACE 4-digit codes
that correspond to carbon-intensive activities following the rationale of their
classification.
The principal activity of a company is classified as carbon-intensive if (i) it
belongs to our NACE list of carbon-intensive activities and (ii) its TRBC activity
code does not correspond to a potentially green activity (see below). For
28For the companies that engage in financial and insurance activities (NACE codes K.64, K.65
and K.66), our categorisation is based on the main activities of their ultimate parents.
29Refinitiv Eikon defines green bonds as fixed income products that offer investors the
opportunity to participate in the financing of large sustainable energy green projects that help
mitigate climate change and help countries adapt to the effects of climate change. The issuance
of green bonds does not necessarily translate into an improvement in the carbon intensity of their
issuers (see Ehlers et al., 2020). We explicitly consider that in the design of our alternatives since
the tilting factors for green bonds under the Strong Tilting and the Strong Tilting+Exclusion
options are lower for green bond issuers that perform worse based on their CCI (see Appendix D).
30For an updated version of the CPRS classification, see: https://www.finexus.uzh.ch/en/
projects/CPRS.html.
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example, if the NACE code of the principal activity of a company is 35.11
(’Production of electricity’), but its TRBC activity code corresponds to ’Renewable
energy services’, this company is not deemed to engage in carbon-intensive
activities. Following this approach, we specify four types of carbon-intensive
activities: (i) fossil fuel activities; (ii) energy-intensive activities; (iii) activities of
non-renewable utilities and (iv) carbon-intensive transportation activities.
Potentially green activities
To identify potentially green activities we rely on the EU Taxonomy of sustainable
activities (see European Commission, 2020). The EU Taxonomy identifies TRBC
codes that capture activities that can contribute to climate mitigation because
they (i) are already low-carbon, (ii) are not low-carbon but can contribute
to the transition to a low-carbon economy by reducing emissions (transition
activities), or (iii) enable other activities to achieve emissions reductions (enabling
activities).31
A limitation of the EU classification is that it includes many carbon-intensive
activities in the list of sustainable activities. These are primarily the transition
activities undertaken by high-carbon companies. Although we acknowledge
the need for promoting activities that reduce emissions in carbon-intensive
sectors, we find it misleading to call these activities ‘green’. It would be
more accurate to call these activities ‘dirty’, whose degree of dirtiness can
decline. Thus, in our list of ‘potentially green’ activities we include all TRBC
EU Taxonomy-eligible activities apart from (a) those with a NACE code that
corresponds to a carbon-intensive activity according to our carbon-intensive
activities classification (see above) and (b) those that are considered to be a
transition activity according to the EU Taxonomy – we keep, however, as
potentially green activities those activities whose TRBC code specifies an activity
that clearly contributes to the low-carbon transition.32
Following this approach, we specify the following potentially green activities: (i)
potentially green forestry; (ii) potentially green manufacturing, (iii) potentially
green utilities; (iv) potentially green transportation; (v) potentially green
information and communication and (vi) potentially green construction. The
reason why we call these activities ‘potentially green’ is because we do not have
sufficient micro data to check if they are actually green. According to the EU
Taxonomy, activities are Taxonomy-aligned if they are both Taxonomy-eligible
and meet the following conditions: (1) they do no significant harm to any other
31These TRBC codes are available here: https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/sustainable-finance-teg-
taxonomy-tools en.
32Examples of TRBC activities that clearly contribute to the low-carbon transition are
‘Renewable energy equipment & services’, ‘Thermal solar systems & equipment’ and ‘Renewable
Independent Power Producers (IPPs)’.
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environmental objective, (2) they comply with minimum social safeguards, and
(3) they meet technical screening criteria, related, for example, with energy and
carbon intensity (see also Alessi et al., 2021). These conditions are not taken into
account in our analysis.
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Appendix D: Climate tilting factors under different
tilting options
Our climate tilting factors capture the percentage change in the BoE holdings of
bonds after tilting, compared to the pre-tilting holdings.33 Hence, the post-tilting
holdings of bond i are given by:
HOLDi,POST = (1 + tilti)HOLDi,PRE (6)
where HOLDi,POST denotes the post-tilting holdings, tilti is the climate tilting
factor for bond i and HOLDi,PRE denotes the pre-tilting holdings. When tilti > 0,
tilting leads to an increase in bond holdings; when tilti < 0, the holdings decline
after tilting.
We use three different versions of climate tilting factors, which correspond to the
BoE Tilting, Strong Tilting and Strong Tilting+Exclusion options, respectively. We
analyse them in turn.
BoE Tilting
We increase the holdings of bonds issued by companies that have been allocated
to climate buckets A and B, according to our replicated Bank of England scorecard
(see Appendix B), and reduce the holdings of bonds issued by companies that
are in climate buckets C and D. To respect market neutrality, the re-allocation of
holdings takes place within each sector s – we use the nine-sector classification of
the Bank of England (see Figure 2). In order for the value of holdings to remain
the same after tilting, the following condition needs to hold for each sector s:
tiltA,sHOLDA,s,PRE + tiltB,sHOLDB,s,PRE + tiltC,sHOLDC,s,PRE
+ tiltD,sHOLDD,s,PRE = 0
(7)
where tiltA,s, tiltB,s, tiltC,s and tiltD,s are the climate tilting factors and
HOLDA,s,PRE , HOLDB,s,PRE , HOLDC,s,PRE and HOLDD,s,PRE are the pre-tilting
holdings in buckets A, B, C and D, respectively, for each sector s. tiltA,s, tiltB,s > 0
and tiltC,s, tiltD,s < 0. The subscript ’PRE’ stands for ’pre-tilting’.







33See also Schoenmaker (2021).
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where tiltA,s,max is the maximum value that tiltA,s can take; tiltA,s converges
towards tiltA,s,max when the pre-tilting holdings of bonds belonging to buckets
A and B are very close to 0.
We set the climate tilting factor for bucket B equal to 50% of the value of tiltA,s:
tiltB,s = 0.5tiltA,s (9)
Similarly, the climate tilting factor for bucket C is 50% lower (in absolute terms)
than tiltD,s:
tiltC,s = 0.5tiltD,s (10)






Note that tiltD,s should not be allowed to take values lower than -1, since this
would imply a higher than 100% decline in holdings (which is not possible). In
our replication exercise we set tiltA,s,max = 0.6 in Eq. (8). This is the highest value
that we can have for tiltA,s,max without getting tiltD,s < −1 in some sectors. The
qualitative implications of our analysis do not change if lower values are used.
Strong Tilting
Under the Strong Tilting option, the climate footprint of bonds is identified based
both on our CCI and the type of activities that the companies engage in. Hence,
bonds are classified following two steps. In the first step, they are classified into
4 different buckets (A, B, C, D) based on how their issuers perform according
to their CCI (see Appendix B). In the second step, we classify bonds based on
the main activities of their issuers and whether the bonds have a ‘green’ label or
not. Based on the categorisation described in Appendix C, we have the following
categories: CIA, GREEN and OTHER bonds.
Table A.1 shows all the combinations of buckets and activities-based categories
that we use under the Strong Tilting option. Positive signs indicate combinations
that exhibit positive tilting factors (i.e. their CBPS holdings increase), while
negative signs indicate negative tilting factors (i.e. reduction in CBPS holdings).
Strong Tilting has been designed such that (i) the increase in the holdings of
GREEN bonds is accompanied by an equivalent reduction in the holdings of
CIA bonds and (ii) the increase in A and B OTHER bonds is accompanied by
an equivalent decline in the holdings of C and D OTHER bonds.
Let us first focus on the tilting related to GREEN and CIA bonds. We need the
sum of GREEN and CIA bond holdings to remain the same after tilting. Hence,
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Table A.1: Sign of tilting factors under different combinations of climate buckets
and activities-based categories, Strong Tilting and Strong Tilting+Exclusion
options
CIA GREEN OTHER
Bucket A (very strong climate performers) - + +
Bucket B (strong climate performers) - + +
Bucket C (poor climate performers) - + -





+tiltC,CIAHOLDC,CIA,PRE + tiltD,CIAHOLDD,CIA,PRE = 0
(12)
where tiltA,GREEN , tiltB,GREEN , tiltC,GREEN , tiltD,GREEN > 0 and
tiltA,CIA, tiltB,CIA, tiltC,CIA, tiltD,CIA < 0.







where tiltA,GREEN,max is the maximum value that tiltA,GREEN can take;
tiltA,GREEN convergences towards tiltA,GREEN,max when the pre-tilting GREEN
holdings are very close to 0.
The climate tilting factors for the rest of GREEN bonds need to be lower since the
climate performance of buckets B, C and D is less strong. Hence:
tiltB,GREEN = 0.75tiltA,GREEN (14)
tiltC,GREEN = 0.5tiltA,GREEN (15)
tiltD,GREEN = 0.25tiltA,GREEN (16)
The climate tilting factors for the CIA bonds of buckets A, B and C need to be
lower (in absolute terms) in comparison with the tilting factor of bucket D. Hence:
tiltA,CIA = 0.25tiltD,CIA (17)
tiltB,CIA = 0.5tiltD,CIA (18)
tiltC,CIA = 0.75tiltD,CIA (19)
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To specify tiltD,CIA, we substitute Eq. (14), Eq. (15), Eq. (16), Eq. (17), Eq. (18)
and Eq. (19) into Eq. (12) and solve for tiltD,CIA:
tiltD,CIA = −
(HOLDA,GREEN,PRE + 0.75HOLDB,GREEN,PRE + 0.5HOLDC,GREEN,PRE + 0.25HOLDD,GREEN,PRE)tiltA,GREEN
0.25HOLDA,CIA,PRE + 0.5HOLDB,CIA,PRE + 0.75HOLDC,CIA,PRE + HOLDD,CIA,PRE
(20)
Given that the value of GREEN bonds in the CBPS holdings is much lower than
the value of CIA bonds, tiltA,GREEN,max needs to be relatively high to ensure
that tiltD,CIA is high enough to reflect our preference for a ’strong’ reallocation
of bonds from carbon-intensive activities towards climate-friendly ones. In our
quantitative analysis we set tiltA,GREEN,max = 1.
Let us now turn to the tilting of OTHER bonds. Since the holdings of OTHER
bonds should remain the same, we have:
tiltA,OTHERHOLDA,OTHER,PRE + tiltB,OTHERHOLDB,OTHER,PRE
+tiltC,OTHERHOLDC,OTHER,PRE + tiltD,OTHERHOLDD,OTHER,PRE = 0
(21)







where tiltA,OTHER,max is the maximum value that tiltA,OTHER can take.
tiltA,OTHER convergences towards tiltA,OTHER,max when the pre-tilting OTHER
holdings of buckets A and B are very close to 0. In our quantitative analysis we
set tiltA,OTHER,max = 0.6, which is the same value as the value that we use for
tiltA,s,max in Eq. (8) in the BoE Tilting option.
The climate tilting factor for bucket B is 50% lower than tiltA,OTHER:
tiltB,OTHER = 0.5tiltA,OTHER (23)
Similarly, the climate tilting factor for bucket C is 50% lower (in absolute terms)
than tiltD,OTHER:
tiltC,OTHER = 0.5tiltD,OTHER (24)
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Strong Tilting+Exclusion
In the Strong Tilting+Exclusion option we follow a similar procedure as in the
Strong Tilting option: we rely on the combination of our CCI-based climate
scorecard and the activities-based categorisation of bonds. The key difference
between the two options is that in the Strong Tilting+Exclusion option we exclude
some carbon-intensive bonds that the BoE has bought and we replace them with
GREEN and OTHER bonds that are eligible but have not been included in the
Bank’s purchases. In particular, the bonds that we exclude are all fossil fuel bonds
as well as the C and D bonds issued by non-renewable electricity utilities. The
signs of the climate tilting factors are the same as in the Strong Tilting option (see
Table A.1).
To apply the Strong Tilting+Exclusion option we first need to identify what we
call ’pseudo pre-tilting holdings’. These are the holdings of the Bank after
the exclusion of the carbon-intensive bonds and the inclusion of the additional
GREEN and OTHER bonds. To estimate these pseudo pre-tilting holdings we
apply the ‘holding factor’ described in Appendix A to the GREEN and OTHER
bonds that have been added to the Bank’s purchases.
The value of pseudo pre-tilting holdings is not expected to be the same as the
value of the pre-tilting holdings – unless the value of bonds that are excluded is
exactly the same as the value of the bonds that are added, which can happen only
by chance. In order to make sure that the post-tilting holdings will be the same
as the pre-tilting ones we adjust the GREEN post-tilting holdings. In particular,







where tiltA,GREEN,EX , tiltB,GREEN,EX , tiltC,GREEN,EX , tiltD,GREEN,EX > 0 and
tiltA,CIA, tiltB,CIA, tiltC,CIA, tiltD,CIA < 0. HOLDEXCL are the holdings of bonds
that have been excluded and HOLDINCL are the holdings of bonds that have been
included. The subscript ‘PS-PRE’ denotes ’pseudo pre-tilting’ and the subscript
’EX’ denotes the ‘Pre-tilting+Exclusion’ option.
We assume that the climate tilting factors for CIA bonds are the same as in the
Strong Tilting option. However, the climate tilting factors for GREEN bonds are
adjusted to make sure that condition (26) holds. As in the Strong Tilting option,
the climate tilting factors for B, C and D are lower than the climate tilting factor
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of A GREEN bonds. More precisely:
tiltB,GREEN,EX = 0.75tiltA,GREEN,EX (27)
tiltC,GREEN,EX = 0.5tiltA,GREEN,EX (28)
tiltD,GREEN,EX = 0.25tiltA,GREEN,EX (29)
tiltA,GREEN,EX is the climate tilting factor that we use as residual to ensure that
Eq. (26) holds. We substitute Eq. (27), Eq. (28), Eq. (29), Eq. (17), Eq. (18) and
Eq. (19) into Eq. (26) and solve for tiltA,GREEN,EX :
tiltA,GREEN,EX = −
(0.25HOLDA,CIA,PS−PRE + 0.5HOLDB,CIA,PS−PRE + 0.75HOLDC,CIA,PS−PRE + HOLDD,CIA,PS−PRE)tiltD,CIA + HOLDEXCL −HOLDINCL
HOLDA,GREEN,PS−PRE + 0.75HOLDB,GREEN,PS−PRE + 0.5HOLDC,GREEN,PS−PRE + 0.25HOLDD,GREEN,PRE
(30)
Let us now turn to the tilting of OTHER bonds. Since the holdings of OTHER
bonds should remain the same, we have:
tiltA,OTHER,EXHOLDA,OTHER,PS−PRE + tiltB,OTHER,EXHOLDB,OTHER,PS−PRE
+tiltC,OTHER,EXHOLDC,OTHER,PS−PRE + tiltD,OTHER,EXHOLDD,OTHER,PS−PRE = 0
(31)







The climate tilting factor for bucket B is 50% lower than tiltA,OTHER,EX :
tiltB,OTHER,EX = 0.5tiltA,OTHER,EX (33)
Similarly, the climate tilting factor for bucket C is 50% lower (in absolute terms)
than tiltD,OTHER,EX :
tiltC,OTHER,EX = 0.5tiltD,OTHER,EX (34)
To identify tiltD,OTHER,EX , we substitute Eq. (33) and Eq. (34) into Eq. (31) and
solve for tiltD,OTHER,EX :
tiltD,OTHER,EX = − (HOLDA,OTHER,PS−PRE+0.5HOLDB,OTHER,PS−PRE)tiltA,OTHER,EX0.5HOLDC,OTHER,PS−PRE+HOLDD,OTHER,PS−PRE (35)
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